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Putting carbon markets into practice: a case study of financial 
accounting in Europe 
Abstract 
The paper explores how carbon markets have entered the world of financial accounting. The 
advent of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005 provided the 
opportunity for global climate change concerns to be translated from policy into something 
that could, and should, be recognized within financial accounting. That is, the EU ETS 
provided a mechanism whereby greenhouse gas emission allowances acquired a financial 
value, simultaneously creating an obligation (or liability) on certain European organisations 
when they emit greenhouse gases.  Prima facie, this process created the need for financial 
accounts of companies covered by the EU ETS to reflect the new commodity of carbon. 
Disagreement amongst accountants about how to treat emission allowances has arisen, with 
the initial international accounting guidance issued in late 2004 subsequently being 
withdrawn, and not yet replaced. Taking this absence of guidance as a starting point, the 
paper undertakes an empirical project (through a survey, consultation analysis, and 
interviews) to establish what financial reporting practices are being adopted by participants in 
the EU ETS, and the level of momentum for standardisation. The paper draws on sociological 
theories about accounting, measurement and markets.  
 
Keywords 
Carbon markets; financial accounting; European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS); standard setting; emission allowances 
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Introduction 
A central element of society’s response to climate change has been the construction of 
markets in which standard units of greenhouse gas emissions (referred to here as ‘emission 
allowances’1) are created and exchanged (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Boyd et al., 2011; 
Bridge, 2010; Callon, 2008).  The largest global carbon market that has been created, to date, 
is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): it comprised 84% of global 
carbon market value2 in 2010 and is worth US$120 billion (Linacre et al., 2011). How well 
carbon markets work depends upon the information provided to the market, and financial 
accounting and reporting by companies is one such source of information (and one which is 
crucial for accurate valuation of companies by investors and others).  In this paper we provide 
an empirical examination of particular financial reporting practices of large corporate 
greenhouse gas emitters within the EU ETS, based on a survey of corporate financial 
accounting disclosures and follow-up telephone interviews with accountants (#5).  In 
addition, we examine the views about emission allowances provided by respondents (#248) 
to an Agenda Consultation exercise conducted by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) in late 2011. 
 
The aims of the paper are both policy-based and conceptual. The paper addresses three core 
questions: 1) What financial accounting and reporting practices for emission allowances are 
being used in Europe, and why?; 2) Is the extent of non-disclosure a problem?; and 3) How 
do sociological theories about accounting, measurement and markets help us understand the 
situation, and provide ideas for action? 
                                                 
1 In the EU ETS emission allowances are called ‘European Emission Allowances’, shortened to ‘EUAs’. For simplicity in 
this paper we use the term ‘emission allowance’ throughout, rather than the more general term ‘carbon credit’ (which 
encompasses carbon offsets as well as greenhouse gas reductions).   
2 Global carbon market value is defined by the total quantity and value of allowances traded worldwide, with exchange rates 
normalised. The remaining 16% of the global carbon market comprises primary and secondary Clean Development 
Mechanism credits, plus a mix of other voluntary carbon offsets (see Linacre et al., 2011: 9). 
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In relation to policy it has been argued that there is a need to standardise accounting in this 
area to ensure the availability of comparable information about participant companies 
(McGready, 2008; The Aldersgate Group, 2007). In particular, since the withdrawal of 
international accounting guidance in 2005 there has been no formal accounting 
recommendation as to how to account for EU ETS obligations, and a diversity of practices 
and types of disclosure have been followed by companies (as found in Lovell et al., 2010; and 
other studies, see PricewaterhouseCoopers and International Emissions Trading Association, 
2007), making comparison between companies difficult. There is an opportunity to conduct 
empirical research in this area because of the continuing (and likely future) uncertainty about 
how to measure allowances (that is, what value to assign to them and the obligations that 
arise in the context of the EU ETS) and account for them (that is, what disclosures should be 
made in accounts). Second, from 2013 onwards, European greenhouse gas emitters will be 
required to purchase emission allowances at auction; auctioning being the default method of 
allocation. It is expected that at least half of emission allowances will be auctioned from 
2013, leaving free allocation for those sectors that are exposed to more risk of carbon 
leakage. This shift to purchasing allowances will have knock-on effects for carbon financial 
accounting, effectively meaning emission allowances will no longer be able to be ‘hidden’ in 
the accounts of many corporations.  At the time of writing these accounting policy issues 
have yet to be resolved, a point that will be further developed in conclusion. 
 
Alongside these policy concerns there is a growing theoretical interest in better understanding 
the implications of the creation of a new carbon commodity, and the associated development 
of new carbon market standards and practices (Boyd et al., 2011; Bumpus and Liverman, 
2008; Lovell et al., 2009). To date, however, the financial accounting issues associated with 
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carbon markets have been relatively neglected (for exceptions see Ascui and Lovell, 2011; 
Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; MacKenzie, 
2009a), and this paper seeks to rectify that balance.  Accounting for carbon credits is in its 
formative stages, that is, rules and practices are still ‘hot’ or unsettled (Lohmann 2009) and as 
such this setting provides an opportunity to explore the process by which new accounting 
principles and practices come into being.  Financial accounting is known to be an area of 
professional activity with intense regulatory activity, and yet the case of carbon financial 
accounting reveals an absence of rules, despite attempts to develop them. Through a mix of 
empirical discussion and theoretical interrogation we seek to explore why this has been the 
case.   
 
Understanding carbon financial accounting 
Before examining our empirical findings we consider how best to conceptualise carbon 
financial accounting, a topic which potentially cuts across a number of different theories and 
bodies of research.  Three areas of literature (theories of accounting and society, theories of 
measurement, and economic sociology (so-called ‘hybrid’) approaches to markets) are used 
as lenses to explore the challenges of governing the financial reporting of carbon, and the 
relationship between accounting and society more broadly. The review undertaken here is 
necessarily brief: it is not the authors’ intention to provide a full summary of these sizeable 
literatures, but rather to consider how this material might provide insight into accounting for 
emission allowances in the EU ETS.  
 
The relationship between accounting and society 
For many years accounting scholars have argued that accountancy is not “a mere collection of 
techniques for the assessment of individual economic magnitudes, but (…) an activity that at 
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the organizational level can shape ‘participants’ views of what is important (…) to create a 
particular conception of organizational reality.” (Burchell et al., 1980: 5).  In short, 
accounting plays a constitutive role in social processes (Hopwood and Miller, 1994) and 
should not be studied "as an organizational practice in isolation from the wider social and 
institutional context in which it operate[s]" Miller (1994: 9).   Accounting is both shaped by 
the social, cultural and political environment in which it operates, and gives rise to social 
processes, and thus is perceived as an instrument for social management and change 
(Burchell et al., 1985). Indeed, "accounting is, above all, an attempt to intervene, to act upon 
individuals, entities and processes to transform them and to achieve specific ends " Miller 
(1994: 1).  In the context of this paper, therefore, the accounting treatment chosen by 
companies constructs the significance of carbon markets, and provide insights into the 
relative importance of carbon in communications to stakeholders via an organisation’s 
financial accounts. 
 
An accounting and society theoretical perspective cautions against seeing accountancy as a 
relatively boring and routine site for studying how markets have come into being. As a result, 
we are interested in how the accountancy profession is responding to increasing societal 
concerns about climate change and the role that accountants are playing in shaping and 
influencing how climate change is made sense of and dealt with (for examples of work on 
this theme see Bebbington and Barter, 2011; Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; 
Cook, 2009; Lohmann, 2009; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011).  Using this perspective, 
accountancy scholars have drawn attention to the often subtle ways that power is expressed in 
decisions about detailed, technical accountancy rules (Miller, 1994; Miller and O'Leary, 
1994; Thompson, 1994).  With carbon accountancy still in its formative stages (and with 
many critical decisions to be made) close attention to all governance processes and decision 
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making, including accounting treatments, will yield theoretical and policy insights. Moreover, 
because carbon accountancy rules (once decided) will potentially have a material influence 
on company financial reports (namely, profit measures, assets and liabilities; as our empirical 
analysis below reveals) it is likely to be a site of conflict.  Far from being rule-based and 
standardised – a ‘neutral device’ – carbon financial accounting is at present highly uncertain.   
 
Moreover, if a lack of guidance regarding accounting treatment persists, the question of why 
we do not see regulation in this area becomes a pertinent one (this is returned to in our 
analysis of the IASB Agenda Consultation).  Indeed, one might argue that ignoring an issue, 
if it is contested and significant, creates one way to ‘resolve’ this tension. 
 
Whilst the literature on accounting and society is directed, of course, to a particular area of 
endeavour – accounting – in an era in which many elements of government increasingly 
involve measuring, standardising, auditing and, in its broadest sense, accounting, the insights 
of this literature have wider application. There are notable parallels, for example, with the 
concept of governmentality (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991), especially in the notion of 
technologies and practices themselves influencing policy (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; 
Power, 1999; Spence and Rinaldi, 2012). But there are some aspects of the case of carbon 
financial accounting in Europe that the accounting and society literature fails to illuminate, 
simply because to date accountants have not been the key actors in making carbon ‘visible’ 
within the EU ETS. Indeed, as we demonstrate below, it is quite the opposite, as the net effect 
of financial accounting has been to obscure the passage of emission allowances in and out of 
corporate balance sheets. So, whilst the EU ETS as a whole has been about making pollution 
visible, thus far it is other market actors – the European Commission, financial exchanges, 
and so on – who have done this work. For this reason it makes sense to broaden our gaze to 
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theories less centred on accounting per se; theories which consider measurement, standards 
and markets. 
 
Theories of measurement and standards 
There is a broad political science and science and technology studies literature about 
classification, commensuration and standard-setting, on topics as diverse as medicine and 
atmospheric science (Alonso and Starr, 1984; Bowker and Star, 2000; Espeland and Stevens, 
1998; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010).  This literature provides an analysis of how diverse 
phenomena are made the same, examining the role that classifications and standards play, 
who does that work, and what happens to cases that do not fit into standard categories that 
have been constructed by society.  The insights provided by these conceptual questions have 
clear relevance to accounting, and indeed have been used to explain and understand aspects 
of financial accounting (MacKenzie, 2006; Robson, 1992).   
 
A central theme of the literature is about the invisibility of the multitude of standards that 
allow the modern world to function, with research demonstrating that once a standard comes 
into being it quickly becomes taken for granted, and then given little attention (Bowker and 
Star, 2000; Busch, 2000; Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). As Timmermans and Epstein state 
"[s]tandards and standardization are such widespread and omnipresent features of modernity 
that, ironically, their precise sociological significance stands at risk of vanishing out of sight." 
(2010: 84).  Bowker and Leigh Star (2000) in their analysis of health service and race 
classifications similarly demonstrate how systems of measurement are typically paid little 
attention on a day-to-day basis: "Good, useable systems disappear almost by definition. The 
easier they are to use, the harder they are to see. As well, most of the time, the bigger they 
are, the harder they are to see." (2000: 33). Financial accounting is one such pervasive ‘big 
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system’ (a 'metadevice' to use the language of MacKenzie, 2009b), and it provides an 
interesting case through which to examine the distinctiveness of climate change as a problem. 
For, as noted (andas our empirical research demonstrates), there is nothing yet habitual about 
carbon accounting practices, and carbon accounting therefore stands in stark contrast to much 
of the rest of accounting, which is relatively ingrained, ‘black-boxed’ and routine 
(MacKenzie, 2006).  
 
One important role of international standards, such as those in financial accounting, is in 
providing a stable calculative frame, defined as “the cognitive and material infrastructure that 
underlies economic calculations of value”  (Callon et al., 2007: 33), thereby allowing markets 
to function. Ideas about calculation, popular in theories of hybrid markets (see below) and 
economic sociology more generally (Callon, 2007; MacKenzie, 2007), argue that far from 
being a rational, abstract process, calculation is in reality determined by a host of factors 
including politics, technologies, and types of expert knowledge. As Mitchell argues "... 
successful calculative devices …are those that make it possible to conceive of a network, or 
market, or national economy, or whatever is being designed, and assist in the practical work 
of bringing it into being." (Mitchell, 2008: 1118). Financial accounting is clearly a relevant 
site of calculation for the European carbon market, but, as we discuss below, it is a site where 
the accounting profession itself appears to be keen not to take centre-stage. 
 
A further insight from this literature that is particularly relevant for the study of carbon 
accounting is analysis of so-called ‘incommensurables’. Bowker and Star (2000) advocate 
concentrating critical analysis on incommensurable cases that do not fit in because they 
highlight unresolved tensions. Emission allowances do not fit neatly under any existing 
accounting standard, and are hence hard to classify, making them a type of incommensurable.  
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The difficulties presented in accounting for emission allowances have their origins in the 
multiple potential uses of emission allowances: as a commodity, a currency, a financial 
instrument and so on (Bank of England, 2009). As Espeland and Stevens (1998: 316) explain 
"commensuration is noticed most when it creates relations among things that seem 
fundamentally different". MacKenzie (2009a) makes precisely this point with regard to 
carbon accounting, outlining how markets in rights to emit greenhouse gases can only exist if 
a variety of different things are convincingly ‘made the same’. He uses the example of how 
the Clean Development Mechanism (part of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol) allows the 
destruction of one tonne of an industrial waste gas, trifluoromethane, or HFC-23, in a facility 
in China to be converted into rights to emit up to 11,700 tonnes of carbon dioxide in a power 
or heat generation plant in Europe (MacKenzie, 2009a).   MacKenzie (2009a) and Cook 
(2009) consider how the problems accountants face with regard to emission allowances are 
complex not only in terms of measurement, but also with regard to classification and type of 
recognition.  The assumptions used to create equivalence in carbon financial accounting can 
be challenged on a number of levels, and where we can usefully add to existing scholarship 
on carbon accounting is in showing how these tensions have played out in practice in the 
financial accounting of carbon within the EU ETS.  
 
Theorising hybrid markets 
Another set of ideas that is relevant for our investigation is about how economic and financial 
markets are created and how they are constituted. An interdisciplinary approach to the study 
of markets asserts that markets are not just economic or financial entities but comprise a mix 
of people, technology, objects and things. This conception of a market draws from economic 
sociology (Barry, 2005; Callon, 1998; Fligstein, 1996; Hardie and Mackenzie, 2007; 
MacKenzie, 2008; Pryke, 2007; White, 1981), and is concerned with how economic markets 
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are separated out of everyday relations and made into a recognisable, working mechanism of 
exchange (Callon, 1998; Munro and Smith, 2008).  In this context, examining the micro-
structures of markets for carbon focuses attention on the intricate networks of people and 
‘things’ that constitute the carbon economy, thereby explaining why abstract models rarely fit 
the specifics of particular times and places. Economic sociology approaches recognise the 
myriad tensions and the hard work that goes into sustaining carbon markets such as the EU 
ETS every minute of every day.  These approaches also recognise that markets have to be 
made: Pryke (2007), for example, assesses the emergence of weather-based financial trading 
instruments since the late 1990s, using a cultural economy approach to finance; likewise, 
Hardie and MacKenzie (2007) examine the workings of hedge funds, showing how the 
market is constructed and shaped by a mix of people and technologies. 
 
Whilst it might sound self-evident that a mix of people, objects and technologies (what 
Callon terms ‘agencements’) determine what a market is and how it evolves, such a framing 
serves as a useful counter to arguments (found in carbon markets and beyond) that ‘the 
market’ itself has agency, or in Callon’s (2008: 539) own terms, that markets are ‘quasi-
natural realities’. A hybrid market approach aims to demonstrate how markets are no more or 
less than the complex network made up of various elements that comprise them. Of particular 
interest in the context of this paper are the technical accounting rules and procedures that are 
essential to carbon market operation.  As noted, these accounting rules and procedures have 
thus far remained outside of the typical frame of reference of many key actors in the carbon 
market. This may in part be explained by the power of technical rules and practices to make 
things appear ‘anti-political’ (after Barry, 2005), suggesting that the lack of attention in 
mainstream carbon market policy debate to issues of financial accounting does not indicate 
an absence of tricky issues, but rather that these issues have struggled to emerge from the 
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close-knit and technically impenetrable world of financial accounting. There is evidence that 
the same applies in converse, with financial accounting standard setters struggling to make 
sense of the complex rules and practices of carbon markets (IASB, 2009). 
 
Another key insight of the hybrid markets literature concerns the potential for markets to be 
actively shaped and governed by various actors. For a new market such as carbon (a clear 
example of something created, in this instance mostly by public institutions and 
governments) it is important to appreciate the implications of its public sector origin (Polanyi, 
1944). Callon neatly explains the value of seeing markets as both governable and 
experimental when he suggests: "[w]hat sociology and anthropology could bring to the 
[markets] debate is precisely a recognition of the experimental character of markets and 
market organisation and the need to debate the consequences of experimentation. It is a 
collective learning process" (Callon, quoted in Barry and Slater, 2005: 114). 
 
The value of these ideas about markets for carbon is in illuminating the experimental nature 
of a relatively recently constructed environmental market - carbon -  resting on the 
commodification of atmospheric gases, and its consequent reliance on sound, workable 
systems of measurement and classification, not least financial accounting (Callon, 2008).  
Further, they open up the possibility for change in how carbon financial accounting is carried 
out, not just in terms of new formal institutional accounting standards (issued by the IASB 
and others) but also via ‘bottom up’ changes in practices, e.g. new accounting practices and 
ideas proposed by the accountants actually doing the day-to-day work of carbon accounting, 
carbon market politics, the classification of emission allowances, and so on. 
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A concern of Callon’s regarding carbon markets is that the ‘framing’ of the carbon market is 
premature. Market actors (including policy makers and politicians) have been trying to 
establish boundaries and rules before really understanding the issues at stake, or truly 
appreciating the novelty of carbon as a commodity. As Lohmann (2009) echoes in his 
insightful analysis of differences between carbon and other types of commodity (in this case, 
wheat): "tensions can be expected to arise whenever a novel commodity is being created that 
depends fundamentally on the development of new accounting procedures.” (Lohmann, 2009: 
507, emphasis added).  Lohmann’s work is unusual here in emphasising the integral role of 
accounting as the foundation of carbon markets and wider climate change mitigation 
activities, feeding into the argument, developed by the accounting and society literature, 
about the constitutive power of accounting in social processes such as market formation.  
 
In summary, in this broad review of literature we have highlighted several ideas drawn from 
work in the areas of society and accounting, measurement, and economic sociology (hybrid 
markets) that provide insights to the case of carbon financial accounting in the EU ETS. 
Now, after outlining our research method, we turn to examine the key empirical findings of 
our research on carbon financial accounting.  By way of introduction a brief history of the 
financial accounting aspects of the EU ETS is given. Through this necessarily partial 
overview it is hoped that a flavour is conveyed of the technical complexity and ambiguity of 
the treatment of emission allowances in financial accounting. 
 
Method 
The paper is based on findings from a 2010 desk-based survey of financial statement 
disclosures of 26 large corporate emitters in the EU ETS, five follow-up telephone 
interviews, and content analysis of the IASB 2011 Agenda Consultation responses (#248 
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letters).  The 26 European companies surveyed constitute 25% of all EU ETS carbon 
emissions.3  This 25% cut-off point ensured that we included in our survey the emission 
allowance accounting practices’ of the main polluters, for whom emissions are most likely to 
be material (i.e. financially significant) to their accounts.  The European Commission’s 
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL)4 was used to identify 68 installations 
(individual factories/power stations) that matched the organisations (#26) that emitted the 
largest amount of carbon in the EU ETS. The companies surveyed are listed in Table 1.  Data 
on the accounting disclosures made in the financial statements of these companies was 
gathered using content analysis which sought to ascertain the systems of classification, 
measurement and reporting followed by the companies. Specifically, we sought to identify 
where emission allowances are recognised on balance sheets (as inventory, tangible or 
intangible fixed assets and how the obligation is recognized), at what value are they 
recognised initially (so called fair value – i.e. market price - or at cost, i.e. nil value in the 
case of granted allowances), and how they are subsequently accounted for (see Lovell et al., 
2010 for further detail). 
 
Accountants from all 26 companies surveyed were invited for a short follow-up telephone 
interview (of 15-30 minutes duration) to explore in more detail why they adopted the 
accounting practices they did; from where they sought and obtained advice and information; 
their opinions on possible future changes to EU ETS accounting; and the role of accounting 
standard setters in this context. Only 5 interviews (19% of companies) were secured, with 
                                                 
3 Note that the EU ETS operates on an installation basis while accounts are provided on an entity (company) basis. Exact 
total for company carbon emission is 25.64%. 
4 Given that the CITL only provides details of installations, and not company data, a matching of installations to companies 
was undertaken: 68 installations were selected from the CITL which equate to just over a quarter of the EU ETS total 
verified emissions in 2008.  The companies owning the installations were then identified via internet searches with 26 
organisations collectively owning these 68 installations. 
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reasons for non-participation focusing on concerns about commercial confidentiality.5 The 
interviews that were conducted were digitally recorded (with the interviewee’s permission) 
and transcribed. Coding of transcripts was undertaken using the qualitative software package 
‘Atlas’, using an inductive approach to coding.  
 
EU ETS Sector Name(s) of companies surveyed 
 
 
Combustion 
 
British Energy, Skupina ČEZ České Energetické Závody (CEZ), 
Drax, East Energia, EDF Energy, Energias de Portugal (EDP), 
Edson, Endesa, Ente Nazionale per l'energia Elettrica (ENEL), 
E.ON, Essent, Grosskraftwerk, Iberdrola, Nuon, PPC Energy 
Group, PGE, RWE 
 
Iron and Steel 
 
Ruukki, Acelormittal, Thyssenkrupp, US Steel Kosice SRO, Tata 
Steel 
 
 
Refining 
 
SARAS, Shell 
 
 
Other 
 
 
Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) 
 
 
Table 1: Company financial reports surveyed – listed by EU ETS sector. 
 
A third strand of our empirical analysis is the responses to an Agenda Consultation by the 
IASB in late 2011. The Agenda Consultation was a general call by the IASB for feedback on 
accounting issues it should prioritise (and not specific to emission allowances). All 248 
response letters were downloaded from the IASB website and searched for the keywords 
‘emissions’, ‘carbon’ and ‘Emissions Trading Schemes’ (or ‘ETS’ – the name of the relevant 
IASB project). The response letters (#53) that mentioned one or more of the keywords were 
further analysed to ascertain their position on emission allowances (ETS as a top or medium 
                                                 
5 This level of non-participation was disappointing for our research project and, in combination with the reasons given for 
non-participation, suggests that the accounting treatment of emission allowances and their impact on corporations is 
perceived as a sensitive and significant issue. 
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priority for the IASB; ETS as a low priority; ETS as a non-priority/removal), and the reasons 
given for their position. 
 
Accounting for carbon in the EU ETS 
The short history of EU ETS financial accounting standard setting has been turbulent (see 
Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Cook, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009a). In the run up to 
the advent of the EU ETS in 2005, accounting guidance was issued by the IASB via its 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) with IFRIC 
Interpretation 3: Emission Rights (hereafter referred to as ‘IFRIC 3’) published shortly before 
the start of the EU ETS in December 2004.  IFRIC 3 made a number of recommendations 
that created a controversy, and which led to its eventual withdrawal. There was negative 
reaction from EU ETS participants, especially by utilities and large industry emitters (Cook, 
2009), and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) issued a particularly 
negative endorsement advice, which carried considerable weight because IFRIC 3 was 
specifically issued to deal with the accounting issues arising within Europe, because of the 
commencement of the EU ETS in January 2005 (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008). 
The main objections included the IFRIC 3 recommendation to report the gains and losses 
derived from the valuation of emission allowance liabilities in the income statement, while 
the gains and losses derived from any revaluation of the emission allowances were 
recognised as equity in the balance sheet (this is known as a ‘mixed presentation model’). 
Additionally, the nature of different assets, some measured on recognition at cost and others 
at fair value (known as a ‘mixed measurement model’), also caused concerns (Bebbington 
and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008; Cook 2009; MacKenzie 2009). These accounting mismatches 
led EFRAG to assert that the IFRIC 3 recommendations would bring about artificial volatility 
in company results (considering that at the time only a small amount of the total emissions 
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rights contained within the EU ETS were actually purchased). Given the negative 
endorsement advice from EFRAG, and also the views of the European Commission, the 
IASB withdrew IFRIC 3 in June 2005. 
 
As a result, since 2005 there has been no international guidance on how to account for 
emissions allowances, and a diversity of practices has emerged (Cook, 2009; Fornaro et al., 
2009; Lovell et al., 2010). An attempt was made to rectify the situation in 2008 when the 
IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board jointly established an Emissions 
Trading Schemes project with the aim of resolving accounting ambiguity through issuing 
clear guidance (IASB, 2010). The remit of the Emissions Trading Schemes project was not 
just the EU ETS but any existing or proposed Emissions Trading Schemes worldwide, 
anticipating that there would be a growth of emissions trading internationally. Originally 
scheduled to publish an Exposure Draft (an accounting term, essentially draft guidelines 
published to elicit feedback) in late 2009 and then in late 2010, the project has now been 
further delayed and since late 2010 has been officially ‘paused’. It may be restarted in 2013 
but this depends in part on the outcome of the wider IASB Agenda Consultation.  
 
Key findings  
One of the main findings from our analysis of EU ETS company reports was the widespread 
extent of non-disclosure of emission allowances (Lovell et al., 2010). In this paper we 
explore this finding in more detail to consider possible rationales for, and a fuller exploration 
of, the non-disclosure.  In addition, the likelihood of the development of future accounting 
standards (as one remedy for non-disclosure) is considered via analysis of the 2011 IASB 
Agenda Consultation response letters. 
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Table 2 summarises the main findings of the financial report survey with regard to disclosure 
(ie the information actually provided by companies about their emission allowances). Much 
of the detail in Table 2 is somewhat impenetrable to a non-accounting audience, but findings 
clear to all are, first, the high level of non-disclosure (ranging from 23% to 77%) and, second, 
the diversity of accounting practices being used across all accounting categories. Here, as 
stated, we concentrate our gaze on the first of these findings – non-disclosure.6  
 
The interpretation of the results about non-disclosure shown in Table 2 requires some 
discussion about the relevance of this information. In economic and financial accounting 
terms, an ‘information item’ is deemed to be ‘value relevant’ (and hence needs to be 
disclosed) if it is influential in shaping the economic decisions about a company by users of 
financial reports (investors, pension funds, shareholders and so on). The value relevance of 
accounting information is affected singularly by its materiality, an accounting term used to 
denote that the omission of this information would impair the ability of users to make a sound 
judgment about the company. In the case of the EU ETS, therefore, non-disclosure would be 
an issue if emission allowances were judged to be material to the company, either internally 
or externally by users of accounts (who might wish to have information on the amounts and 
value of emission allowances held by a company, and the emission obligations arising from 
corporate operations).  Alternatively, if allowances and liabilities arising from the EU ETS 
are not material, then companies are right in not providing such disclosures in their financial 
statements (otherwise, the company would incur so-called ‘elaboration costs’, and the user 
‘interpretation costs’ for a piece of information that has no value). Because materiality is key 
to judging whether or not the high level of non-disclosure for emission allowances is a 
problem, we undertook analysis to clarify the financial value of EU ETS allowances to a 
                                                 
6 Please refer to Lovell et al 2010 for detailed analysis of the accounting practices of large EU ETS companies, which, due to 
space constraints, we do not report on in detail here. 
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subset (#8) of the companies we surveyed that clearly reported the cost of emission 
allowances needed to match their emissions (see Table 3).   
Accounting issue 
Different accounting approaches used and percentage of 
companies adopting them 
Granted allowances – initial 
recognition 
Intangible assets (42%); inventory (8%); other accounting treatment 
(23%); no disclosure (27%) 
Purchased allowances – initial 
recognition 
Intangible assets (42%); inventory (12%); activity-based model 
(11%); other (8%); no disclosure (27%) 
Allowances recognition in income 
statement 
Disclosure (31%); no disclosure (69%) 
Certified Emission Reductions  - 
initial recognition 
Intangible assets (4%); inventory (8%); other accounting treatment 
(11%); no disclosure (77%) 
Granted allowances – 
measurement on initial recognition 
Nil value/cost (62%); fair value (15%); no disclosure (23%) 
Amortization/Depreciation of 
emission allowances 
Yes (12%); no (19%); no disclosure (69%) 
Re-valuation of emission 
allowances 
Taken to the income statement (42%); taken to reserves (4%); other 
accounting treatment (4%); no disclosure (50%) 
Measurement of liabilities Cost with balance at market value (73%); fair value for the entire 
obligation (4%); no disclosure (23%)  
Table 2: Key findings of EU ETS top emitters’ financial report survey   
Table 3 provides information on the materiality of emission allowances using a profit-before-
tax method (comparing the cost of emission allowances needed to match emissions with the 
profit before tax, as reported in the financial reports of the eight companies surveyed). The 
materiality of emission allowances is revealed as high: ranging from 14% of profit/loss 
before tax, up to a staggering 85%. This is an important finding because it means that the 
high levels of emission allowance non-disclosure that we found in our survey cannot simply 
be explained on the grounds of non-materiality. Indeed, the analysis provided in Table 3 
suggests that, even for companies valuing their granted allowances at nil (a common practice, 
adopted by 62% of companies we surveyed, see Table 2), these companies might need to buy 
enough allowances in the market to make emission allowances material to them as well.   
 19 
 
 
Company name Consumption of 
emissions 
allowances (million 
Euros) 
Profit/Loss before 
tax (Million Euros) 
Consumption as a 
percentage of profit/Loss 
before tax 
    
EDP  354   1,505  23.55% 
ENDESA  675   4,308  15.67% 
IBERDROLA  547   3,864  14.15% 
U.S. Steel Košice s.r.o.  138   383  35.96% 
Eesti Energia  9   57  15.79% 
Edson  162   730  22.19% 
PCC  110  -396 27.73% 
Saras  77   91  85.29% 
 
Table 3: Materiality of EU ETS allowances: consumption of allowances as percentage of 
profit before tax (2008) 
 
However, although this sounds like a clear case of unwarranted non-disclosure, the ambiguity 
of the accounting term ‘materiality’ needs yet further explanation, as there is considerable 
discretion (and therefore complexity) in how it is defined and applied, which explains to 
some extent why EU ETS non-disclosure has gone on for so long unremarked.  Materiality is 
often defined precisely (in quantitative terms) as a threshold or cut-off point, e.g. a 
percentage of an appropriate benchmark (such as the profit-before-tax method we used in 
Table 3), in order to judge the size over which an omission would be material. The 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2010), for example, suggests that auditors 
may consider five percent of profit-before-tax to be an appropriate threshold for profit-based 
organizations, therefore making emission allowances material for all the companies analysed 
in Table 3. However, there is a degree of choice regarding the selection of the benchmark and 
the threshold percentage. Our analysis in Table 3 used the profit-before-tax method: the 
annual value of allowances needed to offset the annual emissions as a percentage of revenue 
or profit-before-tax. This was used in preference over an assets-based method (a more typical 
approach for an ‘asset’ such as an emission allowance) because, for emission allowances, 
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materiality cannot easily be judged as a percentage of total assets because a substantial part of 
the assets of large emitters (e.g. electricity companies) have a life-cycle that spans decades. 
Emission allowance assets (as defined within the EU ETS) have a lifecycle of only one year 
(because companies have to surrender allowances to the European Commission every year, 
even though in reality in the atmosphere the greenhouse gases remain for decades, if not 
hundreds of years7).   
To complicate the issue of materiality still further, there is a qualitative aspect to defining 
materiality, as well as the quantitative method described above. Standards setters (IFAC, 
2010) suggest –and empirical research corroborates (Chewning et al., 1989) – that materiality 
is not only judged in terms of the size but also in terms of the nature of the disclosure item. In 
this regard, accounting professionals may consider as material issues of a smaller financial 
value, provided that they are likely to influence the decisions of users of this information in 
cases such as “key disclosures in relation to the industry in which the entity operates” (IFAC, 
2010: 320). This qualitative definition of materiality could well be applicable to large EU 
ETS emitters, as investors are likely to be interested in evaluating the risk arising from the 
future evolution of carbon markets, and climate change more generally. Thus from a broader 
stakeholder perspective, which goes beyond the narrow consideration of investor needs only, 
financial accounting currently appears on both counts (quantitative and qualitative definitions 
of materiality) to be underestimating the wider relevance of emission allowances. This 
materiality finding is corroborated by our interviews with accountants at large EU ETS 
emitters, as one interviewee describes in answer to a question about the future importance of 
emission allowance accounting: 
                                                 
7 In this regard, it could be argued that the EU ETS artificially distorts the true (scientific) atmospheric lifetime of 
greenhouse gases (which in international climate policy is normalised against carbon dioxide at 100 years IPCC, 2007 
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis - Summary for Policymakers Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), Paris). 
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“For our company it will be very important because, as it can be seen in our financial 
statements, we deal with a lot of [emission] allowances.  So, for instance, if we… account for 
these allowances obtained from the government… as intangible assets and amortized them in 
Profit & Loss, we are sure that our Profit and Loss account, on the operational level, would 
be lower by about… 700 million euros….It is very material.” 
(Interview, Deputy Head of Accounting at a large energy utility, May 2010). 
 
So how, one might ask, has this situation of material non-disclosure amongst large EU ETS 
companies been able to endure for several years (since the inception of the EU ETS in 2005)? 
One explanation is that there simply has not been significant pressure to change. There is no 
obvious ‘centre of calculation’ for carbon financial accounting to propose, co-ordinate and 
manage change: the IASB has responsibility for financial accounting standard-setting, but, as 
mentioned, has not been party to the detailed operation and policy deliberations on the EU 
ETS. Likewise carbon market decision-makers at the European Commission and elsewhere 
(national governments, trade organisations) are not familiar with the technical accounting 
debates and do not interact much, if at all, with financial accounting standard setters. Further, 
a ‘bottom up’ push for change from companies active in the EU ETS has not been 
forthcoming because, in the absence of direct financial accounting guidance from the IASB, 
they are, with guidance from their auditors, free to choose their accounting practices. An 
interviewee describes the process they have been through at his company of gradually 
reducing emission allowance disclosure: 
 
“At first we wanted to be very transparent, we wanted to disclose everything, yes?... But 
because we started to have a lot of problems with our auditors we decreased the disclosure… 
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we haven’t changed the accounting scheme, which could have material impact on numbers, 
but we changed the disclosure… we decreased the disclosure very, very much and now it is, 
you know, it’s good.” 
(Interview, Deputy Head of Accounting at a large energy utility, May 2010). 
 
 
The results from a recent consultation exercise undertaken by the IASB – the 2011 Agenda 
Consultation – do indicate some level of support (12% of responses) for the IASB to restart 
its Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) project, and issue guidance on emission allowance 
accounting. 
 
 
Figure 1: IASB Consultation Responses showing the number of respondents mentioning 
emissions trading schemes (ETS), and their suggestions for IASB action.8 
 
                                                 
8 All 248 responses to the IASB public Agenda Consultation (launched 26 July 2011 and closed 30 Nov 2011) were read 
and responses were flagged that contained the keywords ‘Emissions’,‘Emissions Trading Schemes’, and ‘carbon’, and 
compiled them into a dataset. Through the Agenda Consultation the IASB sought input from all interested parties on the 
strategic direction and the broad overall balance of its work plan – there were no specific questions in the consulation 
document about the EU ETS or emissions trading. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, 53 out of the total 248 response letters to the IASB public consultation 
mentioned, unprompted, “emissions”, “ETS” or “carbon”, equating to 21.4% of all responses, 
a significant number. Of these ETS responses, 30 (12% of total responses) suggested the 
IASB Emissions Trading Scheme project is a top or medium priority, 8 (3%) as a low 
priority, and 15 (6%) asked for its removal (or ‘non-priority’). A selection of reasons given 
for prioritisation/non-prioritisation (Table 4) illustrates the relatively strong support for the 
IASB to take action in this area. 
 
Type of Response Illustrative Examples of Reasons given  
ETS as top or medium priority • Narrowed/targeted focus or specifically on free of charge allowances in 
ETS should suffice 
• Due to various jurisdictions and number of entities affected, there are 
risks due to divergent accounting practices, leading to lack of 
comparability for investors  
• In the long term, ETS accounting should be included under the rules for 
“intangible asset” accounting 
• Prioritisation for ETS accounting is a good time to prepare for phase 3 
of EU ETS 
ETS as low priority • There are more important projects such as core work of IASB, and ETS 
accounting is too narrow 
• ETS accounting lie within wider scope of issue of defining “intangible 
assets” and that should be pursued first, with ETS accounting to follow 
on 
ETS as non- priority or removal • There is simply no need for ETS as priority 
• IASB should focus firstly on conceptual framework projects, such as 
revenue recognition, insurance and financial instrument accounting, etc, 
and only after the completion of these projects, should ETS accounting 
be pursued 
• Significant and sufficient work is already done, plus utilities industry 
has already a consistent methodology of accounting for emission 
allowances 
• There is no significant impact from differences of accounting 
treatments of emission allowances 
 
Table 4: Analysis of letters received in response to the IASB 2011 Agenda Consultation that 
mention Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) 
 
Our interviews with accountants appear to back up this tentative support for the IASB 
restarting its Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) project.  
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“We keep books here under three different accounting standards…. Under each of these 
reporting standards we record our emission transactions in a completely different way.  So 
anything that joins these treatments or eliminates differences will help us a lot because this is 
so different and causes such differences between one set of books and another set of books… 
it is every single transaction that is calculated in a different way, so it is very complex.” 
(Interview, Director of Accounting Compliance, EU ETS steel company, April 2010). 
 
And in relation to disclosure (or lack of it) the IASB is seen as the organisation who has the 
power to effect change: 
 
“It is only when it is demanded by the accounting principles or by the IFRS standard, then 
yes, they have to disclose it.  But when it is not demanded then nobody will disclose it by 
itself.” 
(Interview, Head of Finance at a large European energy company, April 2010). 
 
In summary, our empirical analysis of non-disclosure of emission allowances in the accounts 
of large European greenhouse gas emitters has clarified that emission allowances are 
material, and hence disclosure should be taking place. The prolonged absence of a financial 
accounting standard for emission allowances is the reason why non-disclosure is high, and 
the 2011 IASB Agenda Consultation suggests that there is some support for a carbon 
financial accounting standard to be developed.  
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Conclusions 
In conclusion we briefly summarise our key findings and make recommendations for the 
development of policy and theory, returning to our three core questions raised at the start of 
the paper.  First, in relation to our question about the financial accounting and reporting 
practices being used in Europe, our main finding is that there are high levels of non-
disclosure. This is important (in answer to our second question) because it suggests that 
market organisations worryingly have no basis on which to form views about individual 
companies within the EU ETS, and the impact of the EU ETS on their financial positions.  
Moreover, the valuation of most emission allowance assets and liabilities at zero (see 
‘Granted Allowances’, Table 2) provides no information on the risks that might be faced by 
companies should they have to pay for allowances (something that is going to be experienced 
for most companies in 2013).  Taken together, these findings provide evidence of a 
significant lack of key data on activities that are likely to be ‘value relevant’ to investors and 
other financial market organisations.  This is an important anomaly within the EU ETS, a 
market mechanism designed, after all, to make corporate pollution visible. It is evident that 
the ‘calculative frame’ for carbon financial accounting has yet to be stabilized. Indeed, with a 
shift to auctioning allowances in Phase 3 of the EU ETS (from 2013) the calculative frame is 
set to alter, and there are likely to be knock on accounting implications, not least that 
companies will no longer be able to account for assets and liabilities at nil value (because 
allowances will no longer be given out for free). Although auctioning will alleviate the 
accounting problem of the initial valuation of allowances, there is likely to be scope for 
differences between the price at auctioning and fair value because of market volatility in the 
price of emission allowances.  
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Large corporate emitters in the EU ETS, auditors, governments, accounting standard setters, 
academics, and other organizations (carbon accounting charities, specialist industry groups) 
all have the possibility of effecting change in how accounting for emission allowances is 
done, but timing is crucial - it is the next few years that will be most important because of the 
shift to auctioning of allowances in 2013, the inclusion of new industry sectors in the EU 
ETS (notably aviation), and the possible issuance of IASB-FASB guidance in this area. A 
level playing field for accounting treatment and disclosure is required to allow fair and 
transparent comparison of EU ETS financial statements. A key reason for the inaction to date 
is the lack of dialogue about carbon financial accounting, this can be explained as partly to do 
with issues of commercial confidentiality, but also more prosaically as simply about the 
relevant institutions (the IASB and EU ETS branch of the European Commission in 
particular) not having a history of working together; put simply their paths rarely cross. One 
policy recommendation is to have a series of workshops, potentially based around the notion 
of developing a voluntary carbon financial accounting standards,  in order to forge common 
ground and create further opportunities for dialogue. 
 
The existence of high non-disclosure also raises theoretical questions about the ability of 
carbon financial accounting to influence EU ETS policy and carbon markets more generally. 
In relation to our third core question for the paper regarding the insights from theory, 
accounting and society research has demonstrated the role of accounting in influencing 
corporate and wider social processes. But to date the impact of EU ETS financial accounting 
has been to obscure the financial effect of carbon markets on large European companies.  In 
so doing, financial accounting is limiting the effectiveness of the EU ETS, meaning that 
decisions, for example, about investment in low-carbon technologies, are not fully 
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considering the cost of emissions and are therefore in practice not operating in a manner 
consistent with the objectives of the EU ETS. 
 
Hence, crucially, the ambiguity over the materiality of emission allowances to large 
corporations in Europe is less about the significance of climate change per se to these 
corporations, and more to do with the particular systems of measurement and classification 
for climate change mitigation that have emerged through international climate change policy 
and the EU ETS;  policies and market mechanisms which ultimately simplify and frame 
emission allowances within an annual corporate accounting cycle. It seems paradoxical that a 
policy instrument – the EU ETS - that is officially stated as having “forced the cost of 
emissions onto the agenda of company boards” (European Commission, 2008: 5) be in 
practice treated as non-material in the financial statements of the main companies affected.   
In this paper we have demonstrated that far from being rule-based and standardised – a 
‘neutral device’ – carbon financial accounting at present remains highly volatile and 
contested. This makes the study of accounting for emission allowances an interesting case 
study into the nature of accounting, as well as for the operation of carbon markets.  It is 
evident that a great deal of work goes into sustaining carbon markets, and determining 
financial accounting rules and their implementation is an important element of this activity.   
 
The study of the particular issues that emerge in accounting for emission allowances 
demonstrates ambiguity and uncertainty about its outcome and as such can help us to 
understand accounting principles and practices in the making. Following ideas from theories 
of measurement and calculation, one might have expected a lack of international accounting 
standards to make carbon financial accounting practices more visible and a topic of frequent 
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policy debate. That this has not occurred – debate has been mostly restricted to specialist 
financial accounting forums, such as the IASB – can be explained at least in part by the 
highly technical nature of carbon financial accounting, with Barry’s (2005) ideas of 
technology as anti-political having strong resonance.  
 
We have demonstrated how emission allowances are hard to classify - they are a type of 
‘incommensurable’ - and accounting practitioners in the EU ETS are trying to deal as best 
they can with this ambiguity. Others have convincingly argued that carbon market design is 
all about ‘making things the same’, but here we reveal the inevitable tensions in this 
ambitious harmonizing objective, showing how in practice the multiple potential uses of 
allowances (as a commodity, a currency and a financial instrument) pose a problem for 
accountants: for it is accountants who must do the difficult work of stabilizing these multiple 
identities within corporate financial reports, and most companies are therefore presently 
choosing not to disclose.  Ideas about hybrid markets highlight the central importance of 
coming to a decision on standardising emission allowance accounting, in order to allow 
market relations to stabilize.  Recognising that carbon markets have been created by 
governments and other institutions opens up the possibilities for changing how they work, 
including their financial accounting ‘bedrock’. Through their struggle to define and manage 
emission allowances, with multiple framings of calculation still in play, EU ETS accountants 
are playing a crucial but largely unnoticed role in influencing how (and perhaps indeed 
whether) the problem of climate change can be made sense of and governed through markets.  
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